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In the fragments of Melissus we find the earliest metaphysical treatment of pain in 
the Western philosophical tradition. Famous for his one-entity ontology, Melissus argues 
that “what is” does not suffer pain or grief (B7.4–6). The scholarly literature on this 
passage has focused on two questions: 
(1) What is the argumentative structure of the passage?  
(2) Who, if anyone, might Melissus be responding to? 
I will focus on question (1). First, I will provide an account of the argumentative 
strategy of the passage by viewing it in the wider context of B7 as a whole. I will then 
note how this strategy, as well as certain features of Melissus’ diction, suggest an initial 
account of the structure of the passage, according to which it contains three independent 
arguments. This structure will be confirmed as we delve into the details of the arguments 
themselves. One of these arguments will prove the most difficult to interpret, and I will 
v 
suggest two plausible interpretations of this argument, as well as two possible roles for 
the puzzling claim in 7.4 which invokes the notion of an “equal power” (isēn dunamin). 
Finally, we will see that one of the two readings of this claim has the accidental virtue of 
suggesting a response to question (2) above.  
vi 
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Melissus on Pain 
INTRODUCTION 
In the fragments of Melissus we find the earliest metaphysical treatment of pain in 
the Western philosophical tradition. Famous for his one-entity ontology, Melissus argues 
that “what is” does not suffer pain or grief (B7.4–6). The scholarly literature on this 
passage has focused on two questions: 
(1) What is the argumentative structure of the passage?  
(2) Who, if anyone, might Melissus be responding to? 
I will focus on question (1). First, I will provide an account of the argumentative 
strategy of the passage by viewing it in the wider context of B7 as a whole. I will then 
note how this strategy, as well as certain features of Melissus’ diction, suggest an initial 
account of the structure of the passage, according to which it contains three independent 
arguments. This structure will be confirmed as we delve into the details of the arguments 
themselves. One of these arguments will prove the most difficult to interpret, and I will 
suggest two plausible interpretations of this argument, as well as two possible roles for 
the puzzling claim in 7.4 which invokes the notion of an “equal power” (isēn dunamin). 
Finally, we will see that one of the two readings of this claim has the accidental virtue of 
suggesting a response to question (2) above.  
 
MELISSUS’ PAIN VOCABULARY 
Before delving into the text, a few comments should be made about three key 
terms we will meet in the pain passage. We do not find the familiar words for pleasure 
and pain that we encounter in later Greek philosophy, hēdonē and lupē. Instead, we find a 
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verb for suffering bodily pain (algein), another verb for suffering psychological pain 
(aniasthai),1 and both of these are opposed not to what is pleasant but to what is healthy 
(to hugies). 
While algein is typically translated as “to suffer pain” or “to be in pain,”  
Melissus’ contemporary Herodotus also uses it in the sense of “to be ill.”2 This is 
significant, since Melissus contrasts what is algeon with what is hugies, which suggests 
that he may have sickness in mind as much as pain. For this reason I will often employ 
the disjunctive translation “to be sick or in pain” for algein. My intent here is to leave all 
the options open as we approach Melissus’ arguments.3 Melissus’ other pain verb, 
aniasthai, is typically translated “to grieve” or “to be in anguish.” It refers to 
psychological rather than bodily pain. Thus, when Melissus denies that what-is suffers 
either algein or aniasthai, he is typically taken to be denying that what-is suffers either 
bodily pain or psychological pain. However, it could also be that Melissus uses algein to 
refer to being sick (or to having any pain-causing bodily condition); he could then, when 
he uses aniasthai, be referring to the associated painful sensation—the negative feelings 
which accompany sickness (or injury, etc.).4 That Melissus finds it important to rule out 
both algein and aniasthai suggests that he is interested in ruling out both a bodily 
condition and a psychological condition. That he opposes both algein and aniasthai to 
health suggests that he takes algein and aniasthai to be unhealthy conditions of body and 
mind.  
                                                 
1 See Guthrie (1965b, 133n1) for a brief discussion of these two terms. 
2 Herodotus, Histories, 4.68. 
3 That hugiēs, as we will see, has a wider semantic range than “healthy” prevents us from assuming that 
Melissus could only have sickness in mind. 
4 LSJ notes that algein can take a pain word in the dative, e.g., ἀλγήσας ὀδύνῃσι (Il.12.206), which 
suggests that the painful feeling itself is conceptually distinguishable from the algein. Cf. Vitali’s “soffrire” 
(algein) and “ammalarsi” (aniasthai). 
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This leads us to our last term, hugiēs, “healthy.” Like the Latin sanus, it is often 
translated “healthy,” though it has a wider semantic range than this English word. It is 
sometimes better translated as “sound” or “in good condition.” It can refer to both 
soundness of body and soundness of mind, which explains why Melissus finds it suitable 
to oppose it to both algein and aniasthai. It can also refer to the soundness of an 
inanimate thing, such as a drinking vessel, or an argument.5 The etymology of hugiēs 
does, however, suggest that the application of the term to inanimate objects is derivative, 
and that the origins of the word involve the notion of being alive in a good manner.6 For 
this reason, I will typically render hugiēs as “healthy,” although we should keep in mind 
that Melissus may have something more general or formal in mind. Finally, while I will 
refer to our key passage (7.4–6) as “the pain passage,” the possibilities just surveyed for 
the three key terms indicate that other descriptions of the passage might be equally 
appropriate, e.g., “the sickness passage,” “the health passage,” etc. 
 
AN OVERVIEW OF B7 
The pain passage occurs about midway through B7. The fragment itself begins in 
media res (“Thus….”), and without a named subject. Following the traditional practice, 
we may suppose that the unnamed subject is “what-is” (to eon).7 B7 opens: 
(1) οὕτως οὖν ἀίδιόν ἐστι καὶ ἄπειρον καὶ ἓν καὶ ὅμοιον πᾶν. (2) καὶ οὔτ' ἂν 
ἀπόλοιτο οὔτε μεῖζον γίνοιτο οὔτε μετακοσμέοιτο οὔτε ἀλγεῖ οὔτε ἀνιᾶται· εἰ γάρ 
τι τούτων πάσχοι, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἓν εἴη. εἰ γὰρ ἑτεροιοῦται, ἀνάγκη τὸ ἐὸν μὴ ὁμοῖον 
                                                 
5 LSJ, s.v. 
6 See Chantraine (1984, s.v.). I thank Alex Mourelatos for pointing out this etymology to me. 
7 The to eon designation appears several times in the fragments (7.2, 7.5, 8.6, 10), though never, it must be 
confessed, in such a way that guarantees that to eon is the grammatical subject at-large. Barnes (1982, 184) 
supposes that the subject of the discourse is ho ti esti, “whatever there is.” This phrase, however, only 
occurs in Melissus’ text if we adopt a conjectural emendation in B1 (see ibid., 613n13). 
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εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἀπόλλυσθαι τὸ πρόσθεν ἐόν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐὸν γίνεσθαι. εἰ τοίνυν τριχὶ 
μιῆι μυρίοις ἔτεσιν ἑτεροῖον γίνοιτο, ὀλεῖται πᾶν ἐν τῶι παντὶ χρόνωι.8 
(1) So in this way it is everlasting, unlimited, one, and all alike. (2) And it would 
not perish, nor would it become greater, nor would it be rearranged, nor does it 
suffer pain, nor does it suffer grief. For if it underwent any of these things it 
would no longer be one. For if it becomes different, it is necessary that what-is is 
not alike, but that what is earlier perishes and what is not comes to be. Again, if it 
were to become different by a single hair in ten thousand years, it will all perish in 
all of time. 
The initial houtōs (“thus,” “in this way”) suggests that Melissus had already provided 
arguments to support his claim in the first sentence—the claim that what-is has the 
attributes of eternality, infinity, uniqueness, and homogeneity. Indeed, we do find 
arguments in other fragments for the eternality, infinity and uniqueness claims. What we 
lack is an argument for the homogeneity (homoion pan) claim. We do, however, get the 
essential outlines of such an argument in B7 itself.9 In 7.2 Melissus lists several attributes 
that what-is lacks: perishing, becoming greater, changing arrangement, and undergoing 
pain and grief. He then claims that if what-is did suffer any of these attributes, it would 
no longer be one.10 And he supports this claim by arguing that becoming different 
amounts to both: (a) lacking homogeneity, and (b) being a case of the “perishing” of a 
thing which was, and the “coming into being” of a thing which was not. It is not clear 
whether Melissus here regards the things that perish and come into being as the attributes 
themselves, or as the things having and lacking the attributes.11 His argument against 
                                                 
8 Here and elsewhere, I supply the Greek text as it appears in the TLG. I will note alternate readings when 
relevant. 
9 As Barnes (1982, 207–8) has noted. 
10 Solmsen (1969) is tempted to seclude this hen. But there is no manuscript support for this (as he is well 
aware). His main reason for seclusion seems to be based on his contention that Melissus would be “guilty 
of a serious inconsistency” (p. 8) if had written the hen here, since nowhere in the remainder of B7 does he 
substantiate his claim that the denied attributes result in plurality. But, as I will argue, Melissus contends 
that the attributes, insofar as they involve alteration, involve diachronic heterogeneity, which itself amounts 
to diachronic plurality. All he needs to show in the remainder of B7 is how having each of the attributes 
does involve alteration. 
11 Melissus, of course, has no word for “attribute”; he simply speaks of something’s “having” another 
thing. So, in 7.4, a pained thing does not “have” (echei) an equal dunamis with what is healthy. He speaks 
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rearrangement in 7.3 treats the arrangement itself—not the thing having the 
arrangement—as that which would perish or come to be. The final sentence of 7.2, 
however, suggests that he regards the thing having the feature as what perishes and 
comes to be: the slightest alteration (“by a single hair”) amounts to “all (of the thing) 
perishing” (oleitai pan).12  
The solution I will adopt here is that Melissus is committed to both analyses. I 
read the initial analysis in 7.2 as an analysis in terms of features (attribute analysis): “if it 
becomes different, it is necessary that what-is is not alike, but that what was earlier 
perishes and what is not comes to be.” To say that it is “not alike” because an earlier 
thing perishes and a later thing comes to be requires that we regard the earlier and later 
things as distinct from but appropriately related to (i.e., features of)13 the thing which is 
“not alike” in virtue of them.14 When we do this, however, we regard the features as what 
come to be and perish. 
Melissus then extends this attribute analysis in the next sentence, where he gives 
a bolder analysis in terms of the possessor of the attribute (subject analysis): “Further,15 
should it alter” (ei toinun…heteroion ginoito) in even the slightest way, “all of it will 
                                                                                                                                                 
in B2 of what-is not “having” (echei) a beginning or end; of two entities “having” (echoi) limits in B6; of 
what-is “having” (echei) nowhere to move to, because it is all full (B7); of common sense plural objects of 
sense perception “having” (echonta) forms and strength. Melissus himself treats both the things had and the 
things that have them as onta, and he subjects all onta to the same strict requirements. This is why we only 
get denials that what-is “has” some feature, or else “having” occurs in hypothetical (reductio) contexts. All 
of the positive attributes of what-is are expressed as predicate adjectives: what-is is eternal, is infinite, is 
one and is all alike. Saying that what-is has attributes reifies the attributes and risks implying that several 
onta exist—what-is and all its attributes. 
12 I read ὀλεῖται πᾶν with Diels-Kranz and Reale (as does Barnes). Vitali reads ἂν ὄλοιτο πᾶν. There is also 
manuscript support for reading the πᾶν as τὸ πᾶν and as the subject of the previous clause, yielding: 
“Again, if the whole were to become different by a single hair in ten thousand years, it would perish in all 
time.” The point I make here stands in any case: the thing which undergoes the alteration is what is said to 
perish. 
13 Here and elsewhere, “features” is meant to include proper parts. 
14 The three distinct (i.e., non-identical) things are: (1) the “not alike” thing (τὸ ἐὸν μὴ ὁμοῖον), (2) the 
thing that perishes (ἀπόλλυσθαι τὸ πρόσθεν ἐόν), and (3) the thing that comes to be (τὸ...οὐκ ἐὸν γίνεσθαι). 
15 Barnes (1982, 616n20) claims that toinun in Melissus is not inferential. 
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perish” (oleitai pan).16 What immediately concerns us here is Melissus’ claim that every 
alteration is a case of heterogeneity (a case of being “not alike”), and that this amounts to 
a case of pluralism. The pluralism and heterogeneity he has in mind have to be pluralism 
and heterogeneity over time: before the alteration (cf. heteroioutai, 7.2), there is 
something (i.e., to prosthen eon, 7.2) which there no longer is after the alteration; 
conversely, there is something after the alteration which did not exist beforehand (to de 
ouk eon, 7.2). The plurality and heterogeneity can be seen as such only when both times 
(the before and the after) are in view. I will refer to this as diachronic heterogeneity and 
diachronic pluralism.  
Diachronic heterogeneity 
Something X is diachronically heterogeneous iff given two distinct times, t1 and 
t2, X has at least one feature at t1 that X does not have at t2, and X has at least one 
feature at t2 that X does not have at t1.17 
 
Diachronic plurality 
Some state of affairs Y is diachronically plural iff given two distinct times, t1 and 
t2, there is something which exists (or is the case) at t1 that does not exist (or is not 
the case) at t2, and there is something which exists (or is the case) at t2 that does 
not exist (or is not the case) at t1. 
Melissus thinks that every case of diachronic heterogeneity is a case of diachronic 
plurality. Consider an example. If a soccer ball is inflated at t1 but not at t2, it is 
diachronically heterogeneous, since it has a feature at t1 (inflatedness) that it lacks at t2, 
and it lacks a feature at t1 (uninflatedness) that it has at t2. Melissus regards this as a case 
                                                 
16 What Melissus then tacks on, “in all of time” (en tōi panti chronōi) is puzzling. The phrase itself is 
common enough, but what does perishing in all of time mean? Can he really be saying that the perishing 
happens over and over again, at every moment? (For this suggestion, see Barnes [1982, 616n20].) But why 
does he think that? Perhaps instead we can construe the sense as “from all of time,” where the point would 
be that alteration amounts to the thing perishing without a trace, i.e., it never really existed, not even in past 
time. So to be a to eon merely in the past, is to fail to be a true to eon (cf. τοῦ...ἐόντος ἀληθινοῦ, B8.5). 
17 Melissus’ analysis involves four feature-terms: both the feature had at t1 and the feature lacked at t1, as 
well as the feature lacked at t2 and the feature had at t2: the change from hot to cold is thus a dual 
perishing–coming-to-be: the hot (eon at t1) perishes (i.e., ouk eon at t2), and the cold (ouk eon at t1) comes 
to be (i.e., eon at t2). This is why he will claim that pluralism results: one thing eon at t1; a different thing 
eon at t2. 
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of diachronic plurality, because he regards the inflatedness at t1 as something which is the 
case at t1 but is not the case at t2, and he regards the uninflatedness at t2 as something 
which is not the case at t1 but is the case at t2.  
Melissus claims in 7.1 that what-is is “all alike” (homoion pan). The “all” here is 
probably meant to rule out both diachronic heterogeneity (i.e., not all of the “temporal 
parts” are alike) as well as what we might call synchronic heterogeneity (i.e., not all of 
the “spatial parts” are alike at any given time t).18 The soccer ball would be 
synchronically heterogeneous at t1 insofar as it has both black parts and white parts at t1. 
Melissus would also probably think that this synchronic heterogeneity at t1 constitutes 
synchronic plurality at t1.19 
In 7.2 Melissus claims that if what-is were to “suffer” (paschoi) pain or grief (or 
rearrangement or perishing or enlargement), it would no longer be one. He then sketches 
an argument, as we have seen, to show that diachronic heterogeneity (which he 
presumably takes all cases of having these attributes to involve) entails diachronic 
plurality. But this argument will only rule out two types of cases. Taking the attribute of 
pain, the argument will show that the following two cases of pain amount to diachronic 
pluralism: (1) the case in which something goes from being unpained at t1 to being pained 
at t2, and (2) the case in which something goes from being pained at t1 to being unpained 
at t2. We will have to turn to the pain passage itself to see if Melissus offers any 
additional arguments to rule out cases of pain that do not involve diachronic 
heterogeneity: for instance, a case in which something always was and always will be in 
pain.20  
                                                 
18 For further discussion, see below, note 48. 
19 The MXG provides a general argument that suffices to show that heterogeneity of either sort constitutes 
pluralism of some sort (974a12–14; cf. Barnes [1982, 208]). 
20 I will forgo a discussion of 7.7–10, which treats the topic of void. It bears no logical connection to the 
preceding sections of the fragment, by which I mean that none of its arguments rely on (or make any 
reference to) any of the positive attributes affirmed in 7.1 or any of the denied attributes in 7.2, or to any of 
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THE PAIN PASSAGE (7.4–6) 
It is time to see how Melissus directly argues that what-is is free of pain or 
sickness and grief: 
 
(4) οὐδὲ ἀλγεῖ· οὐ γὰρ ἂν πᾶν εἴη ἀλγέον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο ἀεὶ εἶναι χρῆμα 
ἀλγέον· οὐδὲ ἔχει ἴσην δύναμιν τῶι ὑγιεῖ· οὐδ' ἂν ὁμοῖον εἴη, εἰ ἀλγέοι· 
ἀπογινομένου γάρ τευ ἂν ἀλγέοι ἢ προσγινομένου, κοὐκ ἂν ἔτι ὁμοῖον εἴη. (5) 
οὐδ' ἂν τὸ ὑγιὲς ἀλγῆσαι δύναιτο· ἀπὸ γὰρ ἂν ὄλοιτο τὸ ὑγιὲς καὶ τὸ ἐόν, τὸ δὲ 
οὐκ ἐὸν γένοιτο. (6) καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀνιᾶσθαι ὡυτὸς λόγος τῶι ἀλγέοντι. 
 
(4) Nor does it suffer pain. For it would not be “all,”21 were it in pain. For a thing 
in pain would not be able to always be. Nor has it equal power with what is 
healthy. Nor would it be the same, if it were in pain. For it would be in pain when 
something was taken away or added to it, and hence it would no longer be the 
same. (5) Nor could what is healthy suffer pain. For what is healthy, i.e., what is, 
would perish, and what is not would come to be. (6) And concerning suffering 
anguish, the argument is the same as for suffering pain. 
We may label the individual claims as follows (ignoring for now the underlining): 
 Thesis: What-is does not suffer pain.  
οὐδὲ ἀλγεῖ. 
 
[1] For it would not be “all,” were it in pain.  
οὐ γὰρ ἂν πᾶν εἴη ἀλγέον· 
 
[2] For a thing in pain would not be able to always be.  
οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο ἀεὶ εἶναι χρῆμα ἀλγέον· 
 
[3] Nor has it equal power with what is healthy. 
οὐδὲ ἔχει ἴσην δύναμιν τῶι ὑγιεῖ· 
 
[4] Nor would it be the same, if it were in pain. 
οὐδ' ἂν ὁμοῖον εἴη, εἰ ἀλγέοι· 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the additional facts deduced in any of the arguments in 7.2–6. In contrast, the arguments of 7.2–6 take each 
item in the 7.2 list in turn, and frequently make reference to positive attributes in 7.1. Thus, 7.1–6 and 7.7–
10 are logically independent. Indeed, Solmsen (1969, 228–9) suggests that 7.1–6 and 7.7–10 may be 
separate fragments. However, it is worth noting that there may be a thematic connection between the 7.7–
10 discussion of “emptiness” or “void” (keneon) and the 7.4–6 discussion of sickness and pain, since the 
latter phenomena were commonly explained in terms of an “emptying” (kenōsis). See, e.g., De Nat. Hom. 
4. I thank Steve White for pointing out this thematic connection.  
21 I will discuss possible translations and interpretations of this pan below. 
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[5] For it would be in pain when something was taken away or added to it, 
and hence it would no longer be the same.  
ἀπογινομένου γάρ τευ ἂν ἀλγέοι ἢ προσγινομένου, κοὐκ ἂν ἔτι ὁμοῖον 
εἴη. 
 
[6] Nor could what is healthy suffer pain. 
οὐδ' ἂν τὸ ὑγιὲς ἀλγῆσαι δύναιτο· 
 
[7] For what is healthy, i.e., what is, would perish, and what is not would 
come to be. 
ἀπὸ γὰρ ἂν ὄλοιτο τὸ ὑγιὲς καὶ τὸ ἐόν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐὸν γένοιτο. 22 
While the precise role that each of these claims plays in the argument is not 
initially clear, we can discern the overall strategy of the argument. Claims [4] through [7] 
remind us of the argument sketched in 7.2, since they focus on showing that suffering 
pain involves heterogeneity, perishing and coming-to-be. Thus, as arguments against 
pain, they will ultimately depend upon Melissus’ ability to substantiate his claim in 7.1 
that what-is is “all alike” or “homogeneous” (homoion pan),23 as well as his arguments 
against coming-to-be and perishing in B1 and B2. Claims [1] through [3], however, are 
less clear. Prima facie, they do not involve homogeneity. Claim [1] mentions the 
puzzling notion of “being all.” Could this relate to being “all alike” (homoion pan, 7.1)? 
Claim [2] mentions the temporal qualifier “always” (aei). Is this synonymous with the 
attribute of being “eternal” (aidios) affirmed in 7.1? Finally, claim [3] does not reference 
any familiar attributes. I will discuss claims [1] through [3] in detail in a subsequent 
section. 
                                                 
22 I set aside, for now, Melissus’ claim in 7.6 that “the same argument” (ὡυτὸς λόγος), i.e., claims [1] 
through [7], also rule out grief. We must suppose that he thinks merely substituting every occurrence of any 
form of algein with the corresponding form of aniasthai will yield a sound argument.  
23 7.2 suggests that Melissus deduces homoion pan from hen, though the argument there could only yield 
diachronic homogeneity. The MXG provides the general argument (see my note 19). 
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With the overall strategy in view, we can now attempt to discern more precisely 
the inferential structure of the passage. The following structure, I will now argue, is 
suggested by features of Melissus’ diction (ignoring for now the underlining):24 
 
Thesis:  What-is does not suffer pain.  
οὐδὲ ἀλγεῖ. 
 
[1]  For it would not be “all,” were it in pain.  
οὐ γὰρ ἂν πᾶν εἴη ἀλγέον· 
 
[2]  For a thing in pain would not be able to always be.  
οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο ἀεὶ εἶναι χρῆμα ἀλγέον· 
 
[3]  Nor has it equal power with what is healthy. 
οὐδὲ ἔχει ἴσην δύναμιν τῶι ὑγιεῖ· 
 
[4]  Nor would it be the same, if it were in pain. 
οὐδ' ἂν ὁμοῖον εἴη, εἰ ἀλγέοι· 
 
[5]  For it would be in pain when something was taken away or 
added to it, and hence it would no longer be the same.  
ἀπογινομένου γάρ τευ ἂν ἀλγέοι ἢ προσγινομένου, κοὐκ ἂν 
ἔτι ὁμοῖον εἴη. 
 
[6]  Nor would what is healthy be able to suffer pain. 
οὐδ' ἂν τὸ ὑγιὲς ἀλγῆσαι δύναιτο· 
 
[7]  For what is healthy, i.e., what is, would perish, and what is 
not would come to be. 
ἀπὸ γὰρ ἂν ὄλοιτο τὸ ὑγιὲς καὶ τὸ ἐόν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐὸν 
γένοιτο. 
Certain textual details confirm this view of the passage’s structure. First, if we 
note the placement of the confirmatory γάρ particles (“for”), we see that [1] is directly 
subordinate to what precedes it (i.e., the Thesis to be proved). Likewise, [2] is 
subordinate to [1]; [5] is subordinate to [4]; and [7] is subordinate to [6]. This suggests 
that the argumentative role played by each of [1], [2], [5], and [7] is to support or offer a 
                                                 
24 With the exception of claim [3], this is also how Barnes (1982, 217), though hesitantly, views the 
structure of the passage, as does Merrill (1998, 393–6). I here detail textual evidence to confirm Barnes’ 
suggestion.  
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reason to believe the immediately preceding clause.25 But the inferential particles can tell 
us nothing about the positions or roles of claims [3], [4], and [6]. Other features of 
diction, however, do help. Let us deal with [4] and [6] first, as they pose fewer challenges 
than [3]. 
There is some indication that both [4] and [6] are not subordinate to what 
precedes them. Each begins with the coordinating conjunction οὐδέ; and this suggests 
that they are coordinate with something that precedes them. However, other details 
suggest that they are coordinate not with what immediately precedes them, but rather 
with [1].  
Beginning first with [4], one clue here is the protasis of the conditional: “if it were 
in pain” (ei algeoi). What is the antecedent of the “it” supplied in the English translation? 
The apodosis of [4] also lacks an expressed subject, so we must look outside of [4] for 
this antecedent. Turning to [3], we find that [3] also lacks an expressed subject. It, like 
[4], only has a supplied English “it.” However, if we can find the antecedent of [3]’s “it,” 
we also will have found the antecedent of [4]’s “it.” Turning to [2], we do find at last a 
subject expression, “a thing in pain” (chrēma algeon). And this seems a likely candidate 
for the antecedent of [3]’s “it,” since it is the nearest expressed subject and supplying it in 
[3] yields a suitable thought: “nor would a thing in pain have equal power with what is 
healthy.” So, given that the unnamed subject of [3] is chrēma algeon, can this unnamed 
subject also serve as the unnamed subject of [4]? It would seem not. For if it did, [4] 
would be claiming that “nor would a thing in pain be homogeneous, if it were in pain”—
where the protasis is now redundant. So, the unnamed subject of [4] must be different 
than what is both the unnamed subject of [3] and the named subject of [2]. This forces us 
to [1]. While [1] lacks a named subject, it is fairly clear that it must be the same as the 
                                                 
25 Denniston (1950, 58–68) notes that gar may confirm or explain something further back than the 
immediately preceding clause, though he regards such cases as non-standard.  
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subject of the Thesis itself, which [1] supports. And the Thesis’ subject is the implicit 
subject of the fragment as a whole, i.e., to eon.26 Further, [4] makes perfect sense with to 
eon as its subject: “nor would what-is be homogeneous, if it were in pain.” The protasis 
(“if it were in pain”) is no longer useless. And the apodosis (“nor would what-is be 
homogeneous”) is just the sort of claim that Melissus should be interested in establishing, 
since, as I noted above, he has already signaled in 7.2 that suffering sickness or pain 
involves being diachronically heterogeneous, which amounts to lacking homogeneity—
and lacking homogeneity is now asserted of what-is in the apodosis of [4]. What all this 
amounts to is that [4], like [1]—and unlike [3] and [2]—has the same subject as the 
Thesis itself. This may be taken as prima facie evidence that [4], unlike [3] and [2] is 
coordinate to [1]. 
We can now turn to claim [6]. One clue here is in the expressed subject, “what is 
healthy” (to hugies). In contrast to [6], neither of the two claims which immediately 
precedes (i.e., neither [5] nor [4]) has a named subject. As we have just seen, the 
unnamed subject of [4] is to eon. And since [5] is subordinate to [4], its unnamed subject 
must be assumed to be the same, i.e., to eon. This tells us that [6] has a named subject 
which is different from the unnamed subject of both [5] and [4]. Nor is there any mention 
in either [5] or [4] of “health” or anything else that might obviously prompt [6]’s turning 
to the topic of “what is healthy” if [6] were subordinate to either of them. (The only such 
precedent is the tōi hugiei in [3], but we have already had reason to think that [4] was 
neither subordinate to nor coordinate with [3].) Given the absence of other options, this 
counts in favor of treating [6] as coordinate with [1] and [4]. Looking more closely at the 
content will only confirm this initial characterization of the passage’s structure.  
 
                                                 
26 The subject is never clearly expressed in the fragment (see my note 7). 
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CLAIMS [4] THROUGH [7] 
In 7.2 we are given a list of five denied attributes, one of which is “growth” or 
“becoming larger” (μεῖζον γίνοιτο). This, like all the other attributes denied in 7.2, is 
treated there by Melissus as a case of alteration, which amounts to diachronic 
heterogeneity. Furthermore, Melissus later glosses the “becoming larger” attribute as 
something’s “being added” (προσγίνεται, 7.3) to a thing.27 And this is the same notion we 
find in [5], “something being added” (τευ…προσγινομένου, 7.4). This suggests that in [4] 
and [5] Melissus is arguing that suffering pain can be ruled out insofar as it is occasioned 
by the sufferer’s “becoming larger,” i.e., “having something added”—since this, as a 
form of alteration, amounts to diachronic heterogeneity and thereby diachronic plurality.  
What about cases in which suffering pain is occasioned not by “becoming larger” 
but by “becoming smaller,” i.e., “having something taken away” (ἀπογινομένου…τευ, 
[5])? There is reason to think that Melissus conceives of subtraction or becoming smaller 
as a case of partial perishing. That he regards perishing as conceptually admitting of 
degrees is suggested when, in 7.2, he refers to “all (of something) perishing” (ὀλεῖται 
πᾶν).28 Further, it has been proposed by Covotti that “nor would it perish” (out’ an 
apoloito) in the list of denied attributes in 7.2 be read instead as “nor would it lose 
anything” (out’ an apoluo ti). 29 This preserves a nicer parallel between the first two 
attributes, which Melissus treats as a pair. We must assume that he treats them as a pair 
because we must assume that he rules them both out at one and the same time in 7.2,30 
since he moves on in 7.3 to rearrangement. Where in 7.2 does he do this? In the argument 
                                                 
27 While the reasoning in 7.3 is difficult to make out, the μήτε προσγίνεται μηδὲν μήτε ἀπόλλυται does 
seem to recapitulate 7.2’s οὔτ' ἂν ἀπόλοιτο οὔτε μεῖζον γίνοιτο. 
28 This point depends upon reading the πᾶν with ὀλεῖται (or with ἂν ὄλοιτο) rather than with the previous 
verb, γίνοιτο. See my note 12. 
29 See Barnes (1982, 615–16n16). 
30 Compare this to his treatment of algein and aniasthai, the last two attributes in the list: they also get 
treated as a pair, sharing all the arguments in 7.4–6. 
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from alteration to diachronic plurality, he claims that were alteration to occur, some 
attribute would “perish” (apollusthai, 7.2) and another would “come to be” (ginesthai, 
7.2). To lose an attribute just is “to have something taken away,” and to gain a new 
attribute just is “to have something added.” And this, Melissus insists, is nothing but a 
case of perishing and coming-to-be. 
Returning to claims [4] through [7] of the pain passage: If Melissus has already 
shown that addition and subtraction amount to coming-to-be and perishing in 7.2, why do 
we get what appear to be two arguments against pain, one on the basis that it amounts to 
addition and subtraction ([4]–[5]), and another on the basis that it amounts to coming-to-
be and perishing ([6]–[7])?31 Perhaps Melissus finds it worthwhile to present both 
arguments because they appeal to different sorts of considerations, or rule out different 
cases of pain.   
 
AN ARGUMENT AGAINST ANY PAIN ([4]–[5]) 
The first argument assumes an empirical generalization to the effect that for all X, 
if X is suffering P (pain or sickness) at t1, then there is a Y such that Y is identical neither 
to X nor to P, and Y is being either added to X at t1 or taken from X at t1.32 The Y here is 
the “something” (teu) Melissus refers to. Melissus expects his audience to find it 
plausible that every case of occurrent pain or sickness is attended by an occurrent 
addition or subtraction of something—though this something is distinct from the pain 
itself. If it were the pain itself, then in a case of subtraction, the suffering of pain would 
be occasioned by the subtraction of that pain—a result which is presumably problematic 
in cases in which the pain lasts longer than one moment. Rather, Melissus’ opponents 
                                                 
31 I am unable to discern a way to construe these four claims as one argument. 
32 When I say that Y cannot be identical to X or to P, this is meant to leave open the possibility that Y is 
identical to some part of X or some part of P. The former would be appealing in subtraction cases. 
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will suppose that something else, something with a peculiar dunamis [3] and eidos 
(B8)—perhaps “the hot,” “the wet,” or “the bitter”—is what is being added or subtracted 
while sickness or pain is experienced. Melissus himself will not care what thing his 
opponent will suppose is added or subtracted. No matter what it is, the addition or 
subtraction at t1 that necessarily accompanies every experience of pain or sickness at t1 
will be seen to entail a case of diachronic heterogeneity (from the time before the 
addition or subtraction, i.e., t0, to the time of the addition or subtraction, i.e., t1) and thus 
diachronic plurality (from t0 to t1).33 The argument is not restricted to the case of a 
healthy thing becoming sick: a thing experiencing pain at time t1 also could have 
experienced pain at time t0, at time t–1, t–2, etc., as well as at time t2, t3, etc. At every such 
time, however “something” is added or subtracted. 
 
AN ARGUMENT AGAINST ANY TRANSITION TO PAIN ([6]–[7]) 
Melissus offers a different argument against pain in [6]–[7]. This one does not 
rely upon popular physiological theories. Nor does it attempt to rule out any occurrence 
at any time of pain or sickness. It argues instead against the possibility of something 
healthy becoming sick. It relies only upon Melissus’ contention that the alteration 
involved would involve the perishing of something (what is healthy) and the coming to 
be of something else (what is sick). While this would count as a case of diachronic 
                                                 
33 It might be thought that Melissus’ claim that the thing suffering the pain is “no longer” homogeneous 
suggests that he has synchronic heterogeneity in mind (i.e., the thing used to be synchronically 
homogeneous but it no longer is). This does not work in cases of subtraction, however. If the thing 
suffering pain is synchronically homogeneous at t0 (before the subtraction), the only things which could be 
subtracted from it are themselves synchronically homogeneous. So at t1, even though we have a case of 
diachronic heterogeneity (the thing’s size differs from t0 to t1), there is no case of synchronic heterogeneity 
at t1: the thing subtracted is synchronically homogeneous at t1, and the thing it was subtracted from is also 
synchronically homogeneous at t1. Thus, rather than taking Melissus’ “no longer” to signal synchronic 
heterogeneity, I suggest the following account: the thing, even if it were diachronically homogeneous 
across all times t0 and before, is now at t1 “no longer” diachronically homogeneous across times t1 and 
before. 
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plurality, Melissus does not describe it as a case of alteration or heterogeneity.34  He 
seems to want us to view it as a simple case of “coming-to-be”—which is the first 
attribute of what-is to be ruled out (B1), and this on the firm footing of the ex nihilo nihil 
principle (οὐδαμὰ ἂν γένοιτο οὐδὲν ἐκ μηδενός, B1). Thus, Melissus, in his final 
argument against sickness and pain, refers us back to basic Eleatic principles. While this 
argument may claim a “purer” source of justification than the previous one (which relies 
on a popular physiological view), it has a narrower scope: it only speaks to cases in 
which a thing is healthy at t0 and in pain at t1 (or vice versa)—whereas the physiological 
argument can handle cases in which a thing is in pain at t0 and in pain at t1. Of course, the 
physiological argument may be based upon a false view: it may be empirically false that 
every instance of pain is accompanied by the addition or subtraction of something. 
 
AN ARGUMENT AGAINST ETERNAL PAIN ([1]–[3]) 
It is now time to return to the first three claims of the pain passage. We have 
already noted that [2] supports [1], and that [3] relies upon [2] for its subject, i.e., chrēma 
algeon. We must now take a closer look at the content of the claims. 
Melissus has already argued in B1 and B2 that what-is “always was” (aei ēn) and 
“always will be” (aei estai)—i.e., that what-is is “eternal” (aidion), as he puts it in 7.1. 
Granting him this, should he now establish that being in pain somehow entails that the 
thing which is in pain is temporally bounded, then he will have established that what-is 
cannot be in pain, insofar as what-is is eternal. Like the argument given in claims [6] 
through [7], this argument would not be an argument against pain as such, but only the 
special case of pain which never ends. 
 
                                                 
34 His 7.2 discussion implies that he would rule out both (1) any transition to pain, and (2) any transition 
from pain (to health)—as both would be cases of diachronic heterogeneity and diachronic plurality. 
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Thesis:  What-is does not suffer pain;  
οὐδὲ ἀλγεῖ· 
 
[1]  For it would not be “all,” were it in pain;  
οὐ γὰρ ἂν πᾶν εἴη ἀλγέον· 
 
[2]  For a thing in pain would not be able to always be;  
οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο ἀεὶ εἶναι χρῆμα ἀλγέον· 
 
[3]  Nor has it equal power with what is healthy. 
οὐδὲ ἔχει ἴσην δύναμιν τῶι ὑγιεῖ· 
I have thus far rendered [1] as claiming that what-is, were it in pain, would not be 
“all” (pan). But “being all” requires interpretation. The pan here is typically construed 
adverbially, i.e., as “completely” or “altogether.”35 However, an adverbial usage of 
unarticulated pan is not well-attested.36 Another alternative sometimes employed is to opt 
for an adjective that renders the clause more explicable than “all” does. A common 
choice here is “whole.”37 However, Melissus could have said oulon if he had meant 
“whole” (cf. Parmenides, B8.38). It is worth pursuing whether there are any other, more 
plausible options.  
                                                 
35 Both Barnes (1982, 217, 195) and Merrill (1998, 394) take this route. On the basis of a difficult claim at 
the end of B2 that “it is not accomplishable that what is not all, is always” (οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνυστόν, ὅ τι 
μὴ πᾶν ἔστι), they take the pan temporally, as synonymous with aei and aidion. There is no temporal sense 
of bare pan listed in LSJ (there is dia pantos [sc. chronou] only); in other words, this hypothesis commits 
Melissus to an idiosyncratic usage. I prefer not to interpret B7 in light of B2, because I find the latter case 
less clear: the usage of pan is more strained in B2, and the argument in B2 suffers from serious defects and 
difficulties (which I must set aside in this paper). Suffice it to say that Melissus’ claim in B2 does seem to 
commit him to the claim that if what-is is aei, then it is pan [in some sense]. His reasoning in B7 (in claims 
[1] and [2]), on the other hand, seems to commit him to the claim that if what-is is pan [in some sense], 
then it is aei. Barnes and Merrill suppose that pan is being used in the same sense in both passages—i.e., an 
exclusively temporal sense. The passages then jointly entail the following biconditional: what-is is aei iff 
what-is is pan [temporally]. While it may be impossible to save the argument of B2 without supposing that 
pan carries only a temporal sense there, there is no such constraint in B7. Further, as I will illustrate, 
Melissus twice elsewhere in B7 uses pan adjectivally to modify an unnamed subject, and one may read the 
7.4 pan in the same way.  
36 LSJ lists an adverbial use of the articulated to pan (D.III.a), under which heading Herodotus “I.32, etc.” 
is also given as an instance of adverbial unarticulated pan. However, all of the occurrences of pan in the 
vicinity of I.32 can be construed adjectivally. This does not mean that Melissus cannot be using 
unarticulated pan adverbially, but it is worth seeing if a standard (adjectival) construal is workable.    
37 As, e.g., Graham (2010, 473). 
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Melissus uses pan elsewhere in B7 as an adjective to modify an unexpressed 
subject (e.g., pan homoion, “all (of it) alike,” 7.1; oleitai pan, “all (of it) will perish,” 
7.2), though in those cases we find either a predicate adjective or a verb other than esti, 
which helps to fill out the thought. Here in [1] we find pan with esti only. Perhaps 
Melissus is saying that were it in pain “all (of it) would not be” where “be” could be 
interpreted as predicative, and the predicate supplied from the immediate context, i.e 
were what-is in pain, “all (of it) would not be (in pain).”  Thus, in addition to the standard 
reading, which reads the claim as “were what-is in pain, what-is would not be 
altogether”—where “being altogether” is interpreted in light of the attributes of what-is, 
i.e., “were what-is in pain, what-is would not be all (of what what-is is)”38—we can add 
our variant reading according to which pan is a subject modifier: 
Standard:  Nor is it in pain, for, were it in pain, it would not be altogether 
(i.e., would not be all [of what what-is is]). 
Variant:  Nor is it in pain, for, were it in pain, all (of it) would not be (in 
pain).39 
In addition, there does seem to be another way to read the sentence: take the protasis as 
suppressed,40 and construe the participle algeon as predicate adjective, pan as subject 
modifier, and eiē as copula: 
Alternative:  Nor is it in pain, for <if it were,> all (of it) would not be in pain. 
Even in English we can suppress the protasis and still understand the sentence: “Nor is it 
in pain, for all of it would not be in pain.” This Alternative reading yields the same sense 
                                                 
38 My phrase “all (of what what-is is)” can be restricted in various ways. As I discuss in note 35, Barnes 
and Merrill both restrict it to the temporal dimension: “all (of what what-is temporally is)”  
39 If we read the eiē as existential, we get a different reading of Variant: “were it in pain, all (of it) would 
not exist,” which could be construed along the same lines as Standard (i.e., some temporal or spatial part of 
what-is would not exist). 
40 See Smyth (1956, §2349). 
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as the Variant reading: Melissus in both cases is claiming that what-is cannot be in pain 
because if it were in pain, all of it would not be in pain.  
We can now turn to claim [2]: since it is offered in support of [1], perhaps it can 
help us decide between our two possible senses of [1].41 There is only one way to 
interpret [2]:42 “For a thing in pain would not be able to be (what it is, i.e., in pain) 
forever.” If we render the einai as “exist” the sense remains the same: “For a pained thing 
would not be able to exist (i.e., as such) forever.” So, claim [2] can be nothing other than 
the claim that a thing in pain could not continue in pain forever. Why does Melissus think 
this? 
To read his argument sympathetically, we must not arbitrarily restrict our 
conception of algein. As I have already pointed out, Melissus may have sickness in mind 
as much as pain. And there is some intuitive appeal to the thought that a sick thing cannot 
live forever, since sickness is at times terminal in all varieties of plants and animals, and 
even when it is not terminal, it tends to hinder normal biological processes and the life-
activities that they make possible. But suppose Melissus has pain as such in mind. If he 
does, we must still be careful not to arbitrarily restrict pain to the sensation of pain.43 Pain 
experience typically44 involves two “aspects”: some sensation or feeling, and some tissue 
                                                 
41 Strictly, there are two sense-types. As I have already noted (see notes 35 and 38), there are specific ways 
of qualifying the Standard reading, and this is also possible with the Variant reading, where “all (of it)” 
could still be restricted, e.g., spatially or temporally.  
42 If aei could be taken as “at every moment of its existence,” then we get two other possibilities: (1) a 
pained thing would not be able to be (what it is, i.e., in pain) at every point in its existence, and (2) a pained 
thing would not be able to exist at every point in its existence. The latter is incoherent and can be 
disregarded. The former is false: surely there have been unfortunate creatures whose lives (so long as they 
lasted) were never free from sickness or pain. Moreover, Melissus elsewhere uses aei in a sense which 
can—by combining “always was” (aei ēn) and “always will be” (aei estai)—yield the attribute “eternal” 
(aidion) (cf. B, B2, and 7.1). Thus, the current proposal (to take the aei in [2] as “at every moment of its 
existence”) also contrasts with Melissus’ usage elsewhere. 
43 But cf. Diels-Kranz’s “Schmerzempfindung” and “Leidempfindung” (p. 272). 
44 We need the “typically” qualification since there are well-known cases in which one or the other of the 
felt or tissue damage “components” is missing (e.g., phantom-limb; opiate patients). 
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damage or physical disturbance.45 Since the latter is typically involved, it is plausible to 
think that being in pain is typically (among other things) a degenerative, disabling or 
disruptive condition. As such, for something to be in pain is for something to be in a 
condition which, among other things (i.e., having a distinctive qualitative character), 
tends toward the dissolution of that thing. Typically, the greater the temporal duration of 
the pain sensation, the greater the associated degenerative effect. So, Melissus’ claim [2] 
is not based upon unreasonable observations: all observed pained things are mortal 
(temporally finite), and all observed pains are such that the longer the pain (all other 
things being equal) the worse (more destructive) its effect upon the organism.46  
Now that we have settled on an interpretation of claim [2], perhaps this can help 
us settle on an interpretation of claim [1]. Does [2] do a better job supporting one rather 
than the other of the two possible senses of [1]? The options for [1] were: 
Standard:  Nor is it in pain, for, were it in pain, it would not be all (i.e., would 
not be all [of what what-is is]). 
Alternative:  Nor is it in pain, for <if it were,> all (of it) would not be in pain.47 
The Alternative option claims that if what-is were in pain, then only part of it would be in 
pain. If we allow for both spatial and temporal parts,48 then the claim could be supported 
by showing why some temporal part of it could not be in pain, or why some spatial part 
                                                 
45 Again, as noted above (page 2 and note 4), Melissus’ algein and aniasthai could themselves be designed 
to refer to these two aspects (algein, the bodily aspect; aniasthai, the felt aspect).  
46 Even so, the claim which these observations underwrite (i.e., claim [2]) is a claim involving eternity. As 
such, this method of justifying it is not perfectly compelling: it amounts to extrapolating facts about eternal 
(temporally unbounded) things from data limited to mortal (temporally bounded) things. 
47 Or, if one prefers to avoid supposing a suppressed protasis, substitute the synonymous Variant: “Nor is it 
in pain, for were it in pain, all (of it) would not be (in pain).”  
48 One precedent for interpreting pan as referring to all spatial and temporal parts is the homoion pan of 
7.1. It is not uncommon to say that “all” (pan) of something is “alike” (homoion) or is “similarly” 
(homoiōs) F, to indicate that all of its physical components or spatial parts are alike or similarly F. 
Herodotus, for instance, describes a shield as “all similarly gold” (χρύσεον πᾶν ὁμοίως, I.52), where the 
point is clearly to emphasize that there is no non-gold component of the shield, i.e., “all of it” is gold. (Cf. 
also Anaxagoras B12, claiming that nous is pas homoios, wherever it occurs.) This much suggests that 
Melissus intends homoion pan to cover spatial parts. That he also intends it to cover temporal parts is 
shown in 7.2, where he claims that diachronic heterogeneity entails not being homoion. 
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of it could not be in pain. Claim [2] seems to offer a reason why some temporal part of it 
could not be in pain: a pained thing could not exist (as such) forever. Thus, if what-is 
were in pain, some temporal part of it would not be in pain, insofar as all pained things 
are temporally finite, whereas (as we know from 7.1 and B1–3) what-is is temporally 
infinite. 
If we take the Standard reading of claim [1], we can adopt a similar sense for 
“being all (of what what-is is)”: being (spatially and temporally) all (that what-is is). If 
so, then [1] would be claiming that its being in pain would prevent it from being spatially 
and temporally infinite. Again, there would be two ways to support such a claim: either 
show why something in pain cannot be spatially infinite, or show why something in pain 
cannot be temporally infinite. Claim [2], as I have already argued, asserts that no pained 
thing can be temporally infinite. 
So, under either reading of claim [1], we can see how claim [2] can support it. 
The Standard reading has Melissus arguing that what-is cannot be in pain because this is 
inconsistent with what-is being “all” that it is, i.e., taking up all of space and time. The 
Alternative reading has Melissus claiming that if what-is were in pain, all of it could not 
be in pain. Why should we think that this is a problem for what-is? It is a problem 
because Melissus had also claimed in 7.1 that what-is is “all alike” (homoion pan). Given 
claim [2]’s point that all pained things are temporally finite, we must suppose that if 
what-is is in pain, it is either temporally finite itself, or only in pain for part of its 
existence. But what-is is not temporally finite, which rules out the first disjunct. And 
what-is cannot have a feature for only part of its existence (since it cannot be 
diachronically heterogeneous), which rules out the second disjunct. Thus, while either 
reading of claim [1] is workable, there may be some reason to prefer the Standard 
reading, since it requires positing fewer missing premises. 
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TWO OPTIONS FOR CLAIM [3] 
We must now ask what role claim [3] is meant to play. We have seen that either 
reading of [1] is workable, and that in both cases [2] (perhaps in tandem with earlier 
claims made in B7) is sufficient to establish [1]. However, since we have read the pan in 
[1] as referring to both spatial and temporal infinity, and given that [2] is focused on 
temporal infinity, could it be that Melissus is showing in [3] how being in pain is also 
inconsistent with being spatially infinite? 
In context, claim [3] is as follows: 
Nor is it in pain, for were it in pain, it would not be all (of what it is), for a thing 
in pain would not be able to exist for ever, [3] nor has it equal power with what is 
healthy. 
οὐδὲ ἀλγεῖ· οὐ γὰρ ἂν πᾶν εἴη ἀλγέον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο ἀεὶ εἶναι χρῆμα ἀλγέον· 
[3] οὐδὲ ἔχει ἴσην δύναμιν τῶι ὑγιεῖ· 
As was already noted, the antecedent of the “it” in [3] is the expressed subject of [2], i.e., 
chrēma algeon. Melissus is thus claiming, “Nor does a thing in pain have equal power 
with what is healthy.” It is not clear what Melissus has in mind by “power” (dunamis), 
though it is regarded (according to the hypothesis) as something which can be “had” by a 
pained thing and by something healthy or sound. There is no way to construe this as a 
claim about spatial finitude, however: For why suppose that a thing in sound condition is 
spatially infinite? Thus, Melissus cannot be offering a spatial alternative to the temporal 
approach given in [2]. 
One thing to note regarding the dunamis in [3] is its proximity to a related verb, 
dunaito, in [2]. In [2], Melissus had claimed that a pained thing “would not be able” 
(ou…an dunaito) to exist forever. Perhaps in [3] he is offering an account of that 
inability. The account points out that a thing in pain does not have “equal ability” (isēn 
dunamin) with what is healthy. The “inequality” he has in mind must be regarded as a 
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specific case: a pained thing has less ability than a healthy thing. If this is what he means, 
his manner of expressing it is not straightforward. Moreover, it is plausible only if the 
comparisons are made within a class, since, e.g., a sick terrier might still have “more 
ability” than a healthy dandelion. 
Claim [3], according to the present interpretation, also requires—if it is to 
effectively communicate its point—that Melissus’ reader assumes that healthy or sound 
things are the only things with any hope of going on forever. This may be plausible, but it 
is not liable to convince someone who is already inclined to resist [2]. Claim [2]—the 
claim that a pained thing could not go on forever—is no more disputable than the 
conjunction of the following claims (which the current reading of [3] involves): that only 
a healthy or sound thing has a hope of going on forever; that no pained thing has equal 
power with a healthy thing; and that the only way a pained thing could fail to have equal 
power with a healthy thing is to have less power than it. Why think that anyone skeptical 
of [2] would accept all three of those claims? Finally, one other weakness with this 
reading is that though it regards [3] as supporting [2], we do not get a gar in [3], but only 
the bare connective oude. 
Barnes suggests an intriguing alternative account of [3], according to which 
Melissus’ reference to an equal dunamis is not, as in the former suggestion, merely a 
roundabout way of saying that unlike a healthy thing which might go on forever, a pained 
thing could not. Instead, this interpretation shows Melissus, as elsewhere in the pain 
passage, thoroughly versed in the physiological theories of the day. Barnes suggests that 
Conceivably, [3] argues against the suggestion that [what-is] is both in pain and 
healthy, all the time, but in different parts of itself. Pain and health, Melissus 
avers, could not coexist in harmonious equilibrium as that suggestion requires; 
physiology, again must be in the offing.49 
                                                 
49 Barnes (1982, 217). 
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If we adopt the Standard reading of claim [1], Melissus is claiming that were 
what-is in pain, what-is would not be all (of what it is). The specific way that what-is 
would fail to be all of what it is, is by failing to be temporally unbounded. Melissus bases 
this claim on the general claim that a pained thing would not be able to exist forever. But 
a pluralist opponent may balk at this claim: as a general claim it is surely quite false—
indeed, they would offer a counter-example. An eternal state of affairs can be conceived 
in which equal-but-opposing dunameis keep one another in check, with neither gaining 
supremacy. Now suppose that we have such a state of affairs, and specify that the equal 
but opposing dunameis are the dunameis of a healthy thing and a sick thing. To say that 
such things have dunameis is just to say that they have a specific collection of capacities, 
perhaps for acting and being acted upon in a certain range of ways.  
Thus, the suggestion being considered has Melissus, in [3], responding to such an 
objection (which was an objection to his entirely general claim [2]). In short, Melissus’ 
response is to deny flatly the possibility that pain and health could ever coexist in a stable 
and equal arrangement. But is it plausible even to think that one of Melissus’ 
contemporaries would have been inclined to pose an objection like this? 
 
ALCMAEON AND EMPEDOCLES 
Equality of powers plays an important part in the physiological theories of the 
mid-fifth century. It is likely that Alcmaeon’s theory of health was first developed in the 
early fifth-century and was widely influential.50 Alcmaeon’s theory is preserved for us as 
follows: 
Health (ὑγιείας) is the equality of rights (ἰσονομίαν) of the powers (τῶν 
δυνάμεων), wet–dry, cold–hot, bitter–sweet and the rest; but single rule 
(μοναρχίαν) among them causes disease (νόσου); the single rule of either pair is 
                                                 
50 On the dating of Alcmaeon, see Longrigg (1993, 51ff ); Huffman (2008); and Guthrie (1965a, 341–59). 
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deleterious. Disease occurs sometimes from an internal cause such as excess of 
heat or cold, sometimes from an external cause such as excess or deficiency of 
food, sometimes in a certain part, such as blood, marrow or brain; but these parts 
also are sometimes affected by external causes, such as certain waters or a 
particular site or fatigue or constraint or similar reasons. But health is the 
harmonious mixture of the qualities (τὴν δὲ ὑγείαν τὴν σύμμετρον τῶν ποιῶν 
κρᾶσιν).51 
While we cannot be sure how much of this “fragment” is the actual wording used by 
Alcmaeon, the portions pertinent to our comparison are probably Alcmaeonian.52 Note 
the importance of the following concepts, which also all occur in [3]: health (hugieia), 
equality (here in archaic, political guise as isonomia53), and powers (dunameis). Melissus 
would have been familiar with Alcmaeon’s theory, or something like it.54 
In Alcmaeon’s theory, health results when opposing dunameis are in a state of 
equilibrium (isonomia). Melissus, on the other hand, is claiming that the dunamis of a 
healthy thing is not equal toand thus does not coexist in a stable state of equality 
withthe dunamis of a sick thing. It may be that he is drawing attention to the fact that 
health itself can be considered as having a contrary. Health and its contrary, however, 
unlike the familiar contrarieties hot–cold, wet–dry, sweet–bitter (contrarieties with which 
Melissus shows himself familiar in B8), resist entering into a harmonious state: 
experience teaches us that a sick organism either succumbs to its illness or recovers its 
health—one of the two contraries always wins out. Thus, it is implausible to appeal to the 
doctrine of equal-but-opposing dunameis in order to resist Melissus’ claim that nothing 
sick or in pain can go on forever. And if Melissus is indeed alluding to Alcmaeonian 
                                                 
51 DK24B4. Slightly modified version of Freeman’s (1948: 40–1) translation. 
52 See Guthrie (1965a, 345–6) for a discussion. 
53 Guthrie (1965a, 345–6) points out the archaic quality of the political metaphors, and sees it as proof of 
an early date for Alcmaeon. 
54 See Longrigg (1993, 47–103) for an account of the cross-pollination of medical and philosophical 
theories during this period. 
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theory, it is appropriate to render the isēn dunamin in quotes, to suggest that Melissus is 
referring to a technical term of his opponent:  
Nor is it sick, for were it sick, it would not be all, for a sick thing would not have 
the power to exist forever—nor has it “equal power” with what is healthy. 
Scholars have often supposed that Melissus, in the pain passage, must be 
responding to another philosopher. Many suggestions have been aired, among them: 
Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Diogenes.55 If the line of interpretation we 
have been exploring here is correct, then we can add Alcmaeon to the list of candidates. 
However, the considerations which have led us to Alcmaeon also favor Empedocles. 
“Empedocles,” as Vlastos remarks, “builds a universe to the specifications of 
Alcmaeon’s formula of health….”56 It is a fundamental tenet of Empedocles’ system that 
his four roots (as well as his two motive-desiderative forces) are “all equal” (isa panta, 
B17). It is not clear what type of equality Empedocles has in mind. Aristotle puzzles over 
whether Empedocles is claiming in B17 that the roots are equal in quantity or in power 
(De Gen. et Corr., 333a19–34).57 Empedocles is, however, clear that all of the roots are 
of equal age (i.e., eternal). He also speaks of each root as having a peculiar “honor” or 
“office” (timē) as well as a peculiar “character” (ēthos) (B17.27–8), which suggests that 
he would probably regard each as having a specific set of dunameis: e.g., fire, the 
dunameis hot and bright; water, the dunameis cold and dark (B21.3–5). And we can 
imagine Empedocles, were he in a dialectical context, conceiving that—just as Strife goes 
on forever in balanced opposition with Love—so the dunamis (or dunameis) of the sick 
                                                 
55 Heracleitus by Burnet (1908, 376); Empedocles by Longrigg (1985, 113n44); Anaxagoras by Burnet 
(1930, 326); and Diogenes by Diller (1941, 366). Graham (2010, 482) also suggests Anaxagoras and 
Diogenes.  
56 Vlastos (1947, 62). 
57 See ibid. Cf. Wright (1981, 22 and 35n79). 
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or the pained might well go on for ever in balance with the equal-but-opposing dunamis 
(or dunameis) of the healthy.  
Moreover, Empedocles, like Melissus, is interested in grief or psychological pain 
as it relates to what is real and eternal: 
For from these [i.e., the four roots and two motive-desiderative forces] (ek toutōn) 
have all things been fittingly conjoined, and by these (toutois) do creatures think 
and have delight (hēdont’) and suffer grief (aniōntai).58 
And like Melissus, Empedocles—a self-styled “physician” (iatros, B146)—is interested 
in the connections between what is real and what is healthy (see B98, B105, A86). Unlike 
Melissus, however, Empedocles boldly promises his followers a “word of healing for all 
kinds of illnesses,” and relief to those who have been “long pierced by harsh pains” 
(B112).59 Thus, while Empedocles the therapist offers escape from these symptoms of 
Strife,60 Empedocles the metaphysician posits Strife as an ineliminable feature of 
fundamental reality. Melissus, always the sober metaphysician, offers only what solace 
may be gleaned from the insight that sickness and pain are not features of “what really 
exists” (τοῦ...ἐόντος ἀληθινοῦ, B8.5). Sickness and pain, according to Melissus, can and 
must be eliminated from any characterization of to eon that seeks to be true.61 
 
                                                 
58 B107 = Theophrastus, De Sensibus 10. Translation by Stratton (1917, 75). Regarding the four roots and 
two forces as the antecedent of toutōn and toutois, see Wolfsdorf (2009, 63). 
59 Translation by Wright (1981, 264). 
60 On the causal role of Strife in pain and suffering, see Wolfsdorff (2009, 61–2). Cf. Hesiod, Theogony 
226–7, where “tearful Pains” (Ἄλγεα δακρυόεντα) and “painful Toil” (Πόνον ἀλγινόεντα) are among the 
offspring of Ἔρις. 
61 That is, any true account will refrain from claiming that sickness or pain is a feature of to eon—which is 
compatible with asserting positively (as Melissus does) that to eon does not suffer sickness or pain. 
Melissus is not interested in eliminating pain concepts from our accounts of to eon; he is interested in 
demonstrating that there is nothing in the extension of such concepts (i.e., he is interested in eliminating 
pain itself from our ontology). A demonstration of this sort will have to employ pain concepts.  
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CONCLUSION 
As we have seen, Melissus offers three arguments against the hypothesis that 
what-is suffers pain. One attempts to rule out any instance of sickness or pain at any time 
t. It was based on an empirical generalization. Another argument attempts to rule out any 
transition into a pained state. It was seen to be founded on the earliest move in Melissus’ 
deduction, the denial of coming-to-be in B1. A third argument attempts to rule out pain 
insofar as only temporally bounded entities can suffer pain. Two interpretations of this 
argument were offered. According to the first interpretation, what-is cannot suffer pain 
because what-is is not temporally bounded (and all pained things are). According to the 
second interpretation, what-is cannot suffer pain because all temporal parts of what-is 
could not be in pain (which is problematic because this entails diachronic heterogeneity). 
I have suggested that the first interpretation is preferred because it is more direct.  
Additionally, I have offered two accounts of the problematic claim [3]. The first 
of these accounts is minimalist but somewhat unsatisfying, because it characterizes 
Melissus as ineffective in expressing his meaning and unsuccessful in convincing a 
skeptical reader. An alternate account of [3], admittedly more speculative, has the virtue 
of showing Melissus to be an astute dialectician, as well as suggesting an answer to the 
riddle about which philosopher he may be responding to in the pain passage. 
Finally, I hope to have clarified the import of Melissus’ claim in 7.2 that if what-
is were to suffer any of the attributes listed—among which, pain or sickness and grief—it 
would no longer be one (in virtue of its being diachronically heterogeneous and thus 
diachronically plural). While Melissus nowhere explicitly claims that what-is cannot 
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suffer pain or grief because it is one, his claims in 7.2 taken together with certain of his 
claims in 7.4–6 commit him to thinking just this.62  
                                                 
62 Thus the author of De Nat. Hom. is not far off the mark when, alluding to Melissus’ argument against 
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